38.3 Theory and Philosophical Inquiry

Theorizing is a mode of philosophical inquiry. It is an important mode of inquiry in that, as educators/researchers, we take a theoretical stance with regard to our work (Koetting, 1993). Stated another way, as educators/researchers, we work out of a theoretical framework that is very closely related to our orientation to the world. This happens whether we are conscious of it or not. Furthermore, it is important that we reflect on that stance, that we try to understand how that stance affects our practice, and, vice versa, that we understand how the practice influences our theoretical stance. This is directly related to my earlier discussion of the moral nature of our work (we intervene in the lives of people).

How do I define/talk about theory that helps shape my practice, and about how practice helps to shape theory? Stated simply, theory is a "worldview, a way of looking at and explaining a set of phenomena" (Martusewicz & Reynolds, 1994, p. 5). In relation to philosophy and education, Gutek (1988) refers to theory as a "grouping or clustering of general ideas or propositions that explain the operations of an institution, such as school, or a situation, such as teaching or learning," and that these ideas are "sufficiently abstract or general that they can be transferred and applied to situations other than those in which they are directly developed" (p. 250). Theory can also refer to an "opinion that originates from trying to establish generalizable patterns from facts, information, or practices" (Gutek, 1988, p. 25 1).

Where do educational theories come from? How do educators arrive at theoretical positions? Gutek (1988) discusses three sources of educational theory. Educational theory can be derived from philosophies or ideologies; educational theory can be constructed from reactions to certain "social, political, and economic situations"; and theories can be constructed from educational practice. I will discuss each of these sources.

First, theories are derived from philosophies and ideologies. This is the study of philosophy of education. Education is examined within the broader context of individual philosophical systems. Although these systems may not have dealt specifically with education, educators, writers, and scholars derive educational positions from these philosophies and apply principles from their study to schooling. For example, progressivism, as a theory of education, is derived from elements of pragmatism and naturalism. Similarly, I can derive a theory of education from ideological positions. For example, a view of the American democratic ideology can be found in public school settings. Theories of education can be derived from a Marxist ideology. And finally, educational theories can be derived from blending philosophy and ideology, as in social reconstructionism, a blending of philosophical elements found in pragmatism, and ideological elements found in utopianism (cf. Gutek, 1988, pp. 25055). This theorizing is philosophical inquiry.

A second way to develop educational theory is from reactions to certain "social, political, and economic situations." Gutek (1988) suggests studying the history of American education to understand the reactive nature of educational theories. For example, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, educational critics said that:

Schools had become too formal, devitalized, and geared to rote learning. In some of the big cities, school systems were mired in political patronage and corruption. Progressivism as an educational movement and the various experimental schools that it simulated, including John Dewey's at the University of Chicago, were reactions designed to bring about the reform of American society and education (p. 252).

This examination and critique of existing literature (cf Anderson, 1990) is philosophical inquiry, is doing philosophy.

Finally, educational theories can be constructed from educational practice. The effective schools movement provides an example of theory derived from practice (Gutek, 1988). Schools, teachers, and administrators are singled out for their effectiveness in bringing about higher levels of student achievement. Research is conducted, findings are analyzed, generalizations and principles are offered. A research report is published by the Department of Education entitled What Works: Research about Teaching and Learning (1986, quoted in Gutek). The report

...is based on a research investigation and analysis of school practices. Information about these practices is organized as findings. These findings have sufficient generality about them that they can be applied in various school settings. In other words, they represent an emerging theory of education (pp. 25354).

Examples of theoretical generalizations and principles from the report are:

Parents are their children's first and most influential teachers. What parents do to help their children learn is more important to academic success than how well-off the family is.

Children learn science best when they are able to do experiments, so they can witness "science in action."

Belief in the value of hard work, the importance of personal responsibility, and the importance of education itself contribute to greater success in school (all quoted in Gutek, 1988, pp. 25354).

These three sources allow us to engage in philosophical inquiry, theorizing possible understandings of realities/ schooling. This theorizing is a mode of doing research, a way of doing philosophy. As stated at the beginning of this section, inquiry happens whether we are aware of it or not~ and suggests the importance of "thinking about what we are doing" (Greene, 1974, quoting Arendt, p. 6). This theorizing, this doing philosophy, is what Greene (1974) refers to as "wide-awakeness," thinking about commitment and action wherever we "work and make' our lives. "In other words, we shall attempt to do philosophy with respect to teaching, learning, the aims and policies of education, the choices to be made in classrooms, the goods to be pursued" (p. 6).

Another way of talking about theory, to identify the nature of differing theoretical positions, is to view theory in relation to method and interest (Koetting & Januszewski, 199 1). From this viewpoint, knowledge of the world is constructed through a dialectical relationship with that world; i.e., we are shaped by our world, and we help to shape that world. Thus:

...theorizing about that world is part of a social process, and therefore, theory itself can be considered a social construction. Theorizing, as a social construction/social process, arises out of humankind's desire to explain and/or understand and/or to change the world (Koetting & Januszewski, 1991, p. 97).

This analysis is based on the work of Habermas (197 1) and thus has a philosophical position within critical theory. Habermas's theory of knowledge and interests has three forms/processes of inquiry: empirical-analytic, historical-hermeneutic, and critical. Drawing upon a previous work (Koetting & Januszewski, 1991), I will briefly present these processes (see footnote 7).

Theory can serve to explain both the conscious and unconscious. Theory can be seen as a "hypothetical position which can be proven/disproven through empirical testing." It suggests causal relationships:

This notion of explaining things is the basis for rational thought. Nomological knowledge is the result of such endeavours. Nomological suggests lawlike propositions based on the results of the testing of hypotheses. This form of theory (empirical/ analytic theory) has an interest in prediction and control (Koetting & Januszewski, 199 1, p. 97).

Theory can serve to help us better understand/make sense of the world, as well ourselves and others within that world. When we are engaged in this form of investigation, our interest is not explanation but understanding. Thus we are involved in an

...interpretive mode of understanding/theorizing and this theoretical stance to the world sees reality as a social construction. This form of theory (historical/hermeneutic theory) has an interest in better understanding social construction through consensual agreement (Koetting & Januszewski, 1991, pp. 9798).

he third use of theory can help us gain insight into seemingly "given" realities. Through a process of reflective critique we can:

...examine the social construction of reality and seek ways to analyze the contradictions found in reality (the "is" and the "ought"). Through a shared vision we can begin to set about the enormous difficulty of changing (our) individual and group context (p. 98).

To effect change within that context a different understanding of reality is needed. This form of theorizing (critical theory) has an interest in emancipation. In this context emancipation means:

...the possibility of individuals freeing themselves from "lawlike rules" and patterns of action in "nature" and history so that they can reflect and act on the dialectical process of creating and recreating themselves and their institutions' (Apple, 1975, p. 126). In this sense, emancipation is a continual process of "critique of everyday life" (Koetting & Januszewski, 199 1, p. 98).

This discussion of theory/theorizing returns us to the main focus of this chapter: philosophy, inquiry, and education. There are fundamental differences within the empirical, hermeneutical, and critical modes of knowing and theorizing, and these differences are of a philosophical nature. Each form of inquiry has its own understanding of the nature of reality, the nature of knowledge, and the nature of value (metaphysics, epistemology, axiology) (see 9.3). Hence theory and theorizing raise questions of a philosophical nature. To become engaged in raising these questions is philosophical inquiry, is doing philosophy. This is the sense in which Eisner (1991) referred to philosophy as being nagging, "conjoling us" into asking more questions about the nature of things, generating "doubt and uncertainties," and, perhaps, hindering us in getting our work done. Theory and theorizing does lead us to ask questions of a philosophic nature. Giarelli and Chambliss (1984) state that it is the philosopher's "task to ask the unasked questions" (p. 36). They state that "without a formulated question, there can be no inquiry" (p. 36). They identify the special task of philosophy as

...the formulation of questions for reflective thought. The philosopher, as a qualitative thinker, tries to cultivate a sensitivity to the situation as a whole and to the qualities that regulate it... . For the philosopher, the issue always is, "What is the problem?" which in turn depends on a prior question, "What is this all about?" (p. 37).

The philosopher as "qualitative thinker" does not seek certain knowledge or truth, but rather is concerned with meaning. In this sense,

Philosophy does not aim at making the world, for its concern is not action, but qualities. Rather, philosophy serves an educational role. It mediates between immediate experience and experiment and promotes the intelligent development of value (Giarelli & Chambliss, 1984, p. 38).

The educational role of philosophy can be seen within public philosophy of education. Public philosophers of education "see the context of educational problems to be social and cultural life" (p. 40). The social and historical processes of education include the interactions of differing institutions and participants whose intent is to conserve, create, and criticize culture. Public philosophy focuses on creating a context for understanding the process of education as a whole.

Their methods are synthetic rather that analytic and aim to integrate and give synoptic meaning to knowledge from all perspectives (e.g., history, sociology, economics, anthropology, psychology, etc.), about all educative institutions (e.g., family, school, workplace, church, community, media, etc.), in order to construct a context or a vision of education in its widest cultural sense. Without such a context, efforts to resolve educational problems will be shortsighted and short-lived (p. 40).

This position of the public philosophers of education relates to Wingo's (1974) second assumption that underlies the nature of inquiry in the study of philosophy and education, namely, that "Education always takes place within a certain constellation of cultural conditions and therefore it cannot be studied as a set of universal and independent phenomena" (p. 24). Giarelli and Chambliss (1984) build on Wingo's assumption and show the broader context of the discussion (see endnote 8). They discuss the nature of questioning:

All questions arise from within a perceptual field, a whole, a context, or a situation. Inquiry is the exploration of questions (or queries) that arise and take particular shape in a situation. The same may be said for "research," which word comes from the Latin re-circere, "to go around again." Research is going around, exploring, looking within a situation, context, or field. Inquiry, then, is not simply questioning or searching. It is questioning and searching with an intent, with some limits, or with an object in mind (p. 36).

This questioning is a mode of philosophical inquiry and will help to identify the fundamental problems in education, which depend on an aesthetic judgment (axiology) of "where the difficulty is and on qualitative thinking to bring these difficulties into the form of questions and problems that can be researched" (Giarelli & Chambliss, 1984, p. 45). In other words, these "questions and problems that can be researched" are not arbitrary; they do not just "appear." They are contextual, purposive, limited in scope, necessitating further questioning, and have a particular "object" in mind which changes as we question, search, re-question, re-search.

My discussion in this section has gone from theory and theorizing as philosophical inquiry to the nature of questioning within the context of a public philosophy of education. The nature of questioning, our engagement in the process of questioning, is philosophical inquiry, is doing philosophy. The present status of "doing philosophy," particularly philosophy of education, has broadened into multiple discourses. Ozmon and Craver (1995) suggest that the "current mood" in philosophy of education is moving away from "overriding systems of thought" and is concerned with problems and issues in particular contexts, becoming the new arena for philosophy of education. At the same time, the philosophical task remains one of "constant probing and inquiry" (p. xxv). This suggests to me the notion of public philosophy of education mentioned above in the work of Giarelli and Chambliss (1984). This "new arena of philosophy" is what was meant by the construction of a "context or vision of education in its widest cultural sense" (p. 40).