VI

RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES IN EDUCATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY

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38. PHILOSOPHY, RESEARCH, AND EDUCATION

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The concern of teacher educators must remain normative, critical, and even political. Neither the teachers colleges nor the schools can change the social order. Neither colleges nor schools can legislate democracy. But something can be done to empower teachers to reflect upon their own life situations, to speak out in their own ways about the lacks that must be repaired, the possibilities to be acted upon in the name of what they deem decent, humane, and just (Greene, 1978, p. 71).

38.1 INTRODUCTION: PHILOSOPHY AND PERSONAL STRUGGLE

It has been a struggle writing this chapter. Eisner (1991) helps me to understand part of the nature of my struggle. He states that for some researchers within the social sciences, philosophy is often viewed as an “academic distraction.” It is a distraction because:

Philosophy is nagging. It confuses students into asking questions about basic assumptions, it generates doubts and uncertainties, and, it is said, it keeps people from getting their work done. Many appear to believe that it is better to leave the unanswerable questions and unsolvable problems alone and get down to brass tacks. I regard such attitudes as short-sighted. Core concepts in the social sciences are philosophical in nature: Objectivity, Validity, Truth, Fact, Theory, Structure. Why neglect to examine them, even if their examination will never yield a single unassailable meaning? (pp. 4–5).

Trying to deal with the “big picture” in education gets complicated. There is a greater sense of urgency felt today to come up with answers to educational problems. Philosophy takes too much time. There is the sense of “Let’s get down to brass tacks.” Like Eisner, I experience philosophy as a study that does nag at my thinking because, at its best, it has me question and doubt. Because I question and doubt, sometimes it keeps me from getting my work done. Also, I agree with Eisner that core concepts in the social sciences are philosophical in nature. And this is my struggle.

My perspective is that of teacher/student, one who has found much value in the study of philosophy that has helped me to better understand issues in education. My main struggle has been in determining how to convey to the reader my strong sense of the importance of philosophy for research and philosophical inquiry. How should I discuss and analyze, in a philosophic way, philosophy, education, and research? In this chapter, I want to argue for the critical importance of using a philosophical perspective in studying education. I will do this by situating my discussion of philosophy, inquiry, and education within a general discussion of educational research. I will then examine education as a moral undertaking, and therefore the need for not only continued inquiry into the process of schooling but also the need for foundational (theoretical), diverse, and critical questioning. I will argue that the study of philosophy/philosophy of education will provide a framework needed for inquiry into schooling that is foundational (theoretical), diverse, and critical. I will briefly look at the notion of theory and the importance of having or taking a theoretical (foundational) perspective. Modes of philosophical inquiry will be discussed throughout the chapter.

38.1.1 Education and Research

I would like to begin this chapter with a brief definition and discussion of what I would consider a mainstream position of what constitutes educational research (Anderson, 1990). I do this in order to situate my discussion of philosophy, research, and education:

Research in education is a disciplined attempt to address questions or solve problems through the collection and analysis of primary data for the purpose of description, explanation, generalization, and prediction (Anderson, 1990, p. 4).

Anderson’s (1990) discussion in his first chapter entitled “The Nature of Educational Research” expands this definition. He views educational research as primarily problem solving as opposed to testing of hypothesis. This research is based on “systematic and objective observation, recording and analysis”; it seeks to find “general principles and theories which can lead to the prediction of behaviors and events in
the future”; its goals are “understanding, prediction, and ultimately control”; controlled, accurate observation and recording information allows for prediction to be “accurately measured and assessed”; the researcher should be “unbiased” and strive for “objectivity” (p. 5). Furthermore, “research is a scientific process which assumes that events in the world are lawful and orderly” and that the laws are “discoverable.” This lawfulness provides the meaning of determinism and the researcher acts in the belief that the laws of nature can be understood and ultimately controlled to at least some degree. In a nutshell, educational research is the systematic process of discovering how and why people in educational settings behave as they do (pp. 4–5).

As I stated, I believe this is a mainstream position on educational research.

Anderson also identifies “four different levels at which educational research takes place: descriptive, explanatory, generalization, and basic or theoretical” (1990, p. 7). It is within the basic/theoretical level that Anderson places philosophy as an associated discipline:

While philosophy does not typically incorporate primary source data, empirical evidence, or observation, it is included as an associated discipline since it relies on similar approaches to other forms of theoretical research (p. 7).

At the same time, in a previous passage, philosophy is not considered research within the definition quoted earlier:

There is another domain of investigation which some scholars consider research. It includes philosophical analysis, especially conceptual analysis, the situation of educational issues within a philosophical tradition, the examination of epistemological and axiological assumptions, criticism, and so forth. I view such activities as scholarship, but not as research in the sense in which it is used in this text. The principal difference is the lack of primary data in those approaches which rely entirely on critical thinking and analysis of existing literature and theory (Anderson, 1990, p. 5).

The above discussion places philosophy outside legitimate educational research and identifies it as “scholarship.” The opening quote by Maxine Greene identifies what is implicit in the writing of this chapter, namely, the belief that the study of philosophy and philosophy of education is most critical for educators and educational researchers. The study of philosophy/philosophy of education can provide the possibility for the empowering practices that Maxine Greene identifies: reflection on one’s own life situation, one’s own voice with which to speak, and the possibility for action based on decency, humaneness, and justice.

38.1.2 Education as a Moral Undertaking

The study of philosophy/philosophy of education can provide greater insight and understanding into the complexities of schooling. By complexities of schooling I mean that educational practice does not “just happen,” does not take place as an isolated activity. Wingo (1974) identifies the complexities of the school setting:

Behind every approach to teaching method, behind every plan for administrative organization of the schools, behind the structure of every school curriculum stands a body of accepted doctrine—assumptions, concepts, generalizations, and values. In short, every practical approach to the art of teaching is shored up by some constellation of accepted ideas. Very often, however, the very presence of this body of ideas goes unnoticed. Its acceptance is largely unconscious and based on tradition (p. 6).

Let me be more explicit about this.

As educators, we are concerned with philosophical issues and perspectives in our daily work within classrooms. As we debate curricular issues, as we decide educational policy, as we work with students and their “behavior,” as we “test” students’ “knowledge,” etc., we are concerned with philosophy. However, as Wingo stated in the above quote, the underlying ideas behind our practice may go unnoticed, may be unconscious, may be unquestioned. The importance of philosophical inquiry in education is exactly at this point: It can illuminate, inform, or call into question the taken-for-granted notions that we have. Philosophical inquiry and analysis can help conceptual clarification, as well as inform our praxis, and vice versa.

The Western tradition in philosophy has wrestled with the following questions: What is real (metaphysics/ontology)? How do we know (epistemology)? What is of value (axiology)? Understanding and identifying the nature of reality, what counts for knowledge, and making judgments as to what is of value are all philosophical positions. I will use the term philosophical inquiry to mean a form of questioning into (to inquire into) the nature of reality, knowledge, and value. This notion of inquiry is the beginning of doing philosophy, of inquiring into the nature of things (Greene, 1974).

The three questions/positions regarding the nature of reality, knowledge, and value also identify the nature of the concerns of schooling as well as form the basis for philosophical inquiry. If this is so, the lives of educators/researchers are rooted in philosophical and moral struggles and questions, and consequently they cannot view their work as a neutral enterprise. Their lives are rooted in philosophical, moral, and nonneutral (political) realities because educators, schools, communities, interest groups, legislators, religious organizations, and private and corporate enterprise presuppose some conception of reality that they wish to transmit, or pass on to the young. As Childs (1950) stated:

... deliberate education is never morally neutral. A definite expression of preference for certain human ends, or values, is inherent in all efforts to guide the experience of the young. No human group would ever bother to found and maintain a system of schools were it not concerned to make of its children something other than they would become if left to themselves and their surroundings (p. 19).

School practice reflects the interests of divergent groups. The metaphysical/ontological, epistemological, and axiological
questions of philosophy are educational questions as well. Research in education reflects this. The differing groups mentioned have interests, and those interests identify the political nature of education (see 1.4).

School curricula reflect multiple world views. Curricula reflect the possibilities of humankind. Curricula can raise critical questions about the nature of the social world and how we know that world, or it can dogmatically repress such exploration. To choose a specific curriculum is to choose from among many possibilities. Curricular decision making is hence a political decision. To say that "...education is a moral undertaking involves choices that make a difference in the individual and social lives of human beings" (Morris & Pai, 1976, p. 18).

The concept of moral as used here is from Child's work (1950) Education and Morals. He uses the term quite specifically regarding educators' intervention in the lives of their students. Moral refers to:

... the more elemental fact that choices among genuine life-alternatives are inescapably involved in the construction and the actual conduct of each and every educational program. These choices necessarily have consequences in the lives of the young, and through them in the life of the society. Viewed from this perspective, education undoubtedly ranks as one of the outstanding moral undertakings of the human race (p. 20).

Furthermore, education is rooted in philosophical and political realities. The philosophical and political roots come in when we are required to make choices from among many possible world-views.1

If education is a moral undertaking, as Childs rightly suggests, it is incumbent upon educators to "inquire into their work," to question their theory and practice. Philosophical inquiry provides various ways of doing that.

38.2 PHILOSOPHY AND INQUIRY

Although I was critical of Anderson's (1990) discussion of philosophy and research, I do think he accurately represent- ed the processes of philosophical inquiry: conceptual analysis, situating educational issues within a philosophical tradition, and the examination of epistemological and axiological assumptions, criticism, etc. He also emphasized critical thinking and analysis of existing literature and theory as part of philosophical inquiry. These processes are modes of philosophical inquiry, ways of doing philosophy.

My criticism of Anderson's position centered on his viewing philosophy as an "associated discipline" for research, whereas I believe it to be a foundation (theory) for educational research. To begin to address philosophy as foundation, I will return to the three questions that have concerned philosophers within the Western traditions from the beginning.

What is the nature of reality? What is the nature of knowledge? What is of value (metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, respectively)? These questions provide a conceptual framework that gives coherence to the study of philosophy. These questions also identify the major concerns of education and provide the possibility for a coherence in educational practice. By coherence I mean they provide educators with a possible framework for posing questions from multiple perspectives that allow us to reflect on our work. For example, they allow us to pose multiple questions regarding the nature of curricula. They allow us to examine whose knowledge we are promoting, and, even prior to that, what knowledge is of most worth. Questions of value ask us why we choose this particular knowledge and leave all of the rest out, etc. Engaging in this questioning is philosophical inquiry, is "doing" philosophy.

Another framework I can use in looking at the relationship among philosophy, research, and education would be an examination of the differing approaches to the study of philosophy. Wingo (1974) states that we can approach the study of philosophy in three different ways (these ways may also be looked at as the main functions of philosophy): the descriptive, the normative, and the analytic (pp. 15–16).

To engage in descriptive philosophical inquiry, a student would be involved in the study of the history of philosophy. She or he would be studying

... what is (and has been) the field of philosophy. Working comprehensively, he is trying to picture the general development of philosophical thought (p. 15).

This is more than studying "intellectual history." As Wingo points out, it is possible to study about what philosophers have said, and at the same time be doing philosophy in that students are "analyzing and clarifying concepts and the language in which ideas are expressed" (p. 15). This is the area that Anderson (1990) identified as situating educational issues within a philosophical tradition—for example, educational issues looked at from the viewpoint of different philosophies, and what writers within those philosophical traditions said about the issues, how they would go about making sense of those issues, establish a world view (metaphysics/ontology), a way of knowing (epistemology), and a way to make decisions regarding action (axiology). Philosophy of education textbooks would be good examples of the descriptive perspective.2

To engage in normative philosophical inquiry a student would be involved with values (axiology). Interests could focus on

... ethics or aesthetics. He will be involved with advocating some ends or objectives (values) that he believes to be desirable and with explaining the reasons for their desirability. He may also be involved in suggesting means for advocating these values. His main concern is not what is, but what ought to be (p. 15).

Normative philosophical inquiry explores and critiques philosophical positions, as well as makes decisions as the

*Superscript numbers refer to end-of-chapter "Endnotes."
"rightness and wrongness" of those positions (see Webb et al., 1992). The normative perspective reflects Anderson's (1990) earlier position regarding examination of epistemological and axiological assumptions, as well as critical thinking and analysis of existing literature and theory as part of inquiry.3

To engage in analytic philosophical inquiry is to engage in the "analysis of language, concepts, theories, and so on" (Wingo, 1974, p. 15). This is the practice that analytic philosophers consider "doing philosophy." According to Webb et al. (1992), analytic philosophy has as its goal

... to improve our understanding of education by clarifying our educational concepts, beliefs, arguments, assumptions. For example, an analytic philosophy of education would attempt to understand such questions as: What is experience? What is understanding? What is readiness? (pp. 174–75).

Anderson referred to the analytic perspective as conceptual analysis.4

The framework of the "functions" of philosophy suggests the foundations position mentioned earlier. Each of these three functions can provide multiple possibilities for educational research and, more specifically, philosophical inquiry. The descriptive, normative, and analytic forms of philosophical inquiry suggest in-depth study of the philosophy of education. Looking at different philosophical traditions with regard to metaphysics/ontology, epistemology, and axiology requires study in philosophy. Movements in education, e.g., reconstructionism, perennialism, Marxism and education, and more recent movements rooted in critical theory, postmodern analyses, and renewed emphasis on democratic schooling and forms of emancipatory praxis represent major areas of study for researchers (see Chapters 9, 10). These areas of study have their own world views and concerns. Writers within these positions offer differing conceptual frameworks, differing questions posed, and hence challenges to status quo practice. And they all engage the student in philosophical inquiry.

I believe that the study of the philosophy of education from the normative, descriptive, and analytic perspectives offers critical means of inquiry into educational realities for researchers. Writing within these frameworks is doing philosophy. Doing philosophy is doing research. The descriptive perspective works out of systems of philosophical thought, schools of thought, and offering foundational positions from which to work; the normative perspective offers a "process of inquiry into ideas and basic beliefs that will enable us to form reasoned attitudes about the important issues of our time" (Wingo, 1974, p. 22). The analytic perspective allows us to inquire into the use of language, the meaning and clarification of language used to talk about education. This is philosophical inquiry. This is doing philosophy.

Education, being a very complex social undertaking, has many important dimensions that can be examined from psychological (see Chapters 2, 5), sociological, and political perspectives, yet there is one question that is uniquely philosophical (see Chapter 6): "the question of determining the ends of education" (Wingo, 1974, p. 22). The means and ends of education are inseparably united. Wingo (1974) quotes Max Black:

All serious discussion of educational problems, no matter how specific, soon leads to consideration of educational aims, and becomes a conversation about the good life, the nature of man, the varieties of experience. But these are the perennial themes of philosophical investigation. It might be a hard thing to expect educators to be philosophical, but can they be anything else? (p. 22).

Conceptualizations about "the good life," the nature of humankind, etc., are problematic in the sense that there are no final, all-inclusive positions on these concepts. Inquiry into these issues can take place through the descriptive, normative, and analytic perspectives. Each of these perspectives, again, will demand that different questions be posed. This process is doing philosophy, doing philosophical inquiry.

To understand how the three perspectives can be used in the study of education, Wingo (1974) suggests that there are three assumptions that underlie the nature of philosophical inquiry in education. These three assumptions are critical to an understanding of the importance, scope, and possibility the study of philosophy has for the study of education. As obvious as it may seem, the first assumption is: "The primary subject matter of philosophy of education is education itself" (p. 24). Thus the phenomena of education, in all its myriad forms, are the "subject matter" for study. From a research point of view this can mean looking at curricula, the outcomes of learning, testing, organizational matters, place of schools within the social setting, the means-ends of education, etc., etc.

The second, and perhaps the most insightful and critical assumption, states that "Education always takes place within a certain constellation of cultural conditions and therefore it cannot be studied as a set of universal and independent phenomena" (p. 24). This assumption means that there is no "one best system" to model schools after and no single answer to complex educational situations. This assumption suggests that we need to view education relationally, in context (cf. Apple, 1979; Beyer, 1986; Purpel, 1993), and clearly identifies the complex nature of understanding education. At the same time, this assumption suggests the myriad possibilities for inquiry into the process of schooling. By this I mean that the nature of the inquiry is dependent on the researcher. It is not standardized; it is not given (cf. Eisner, 1991).

The third assumption states that the "basic purpose of philosophy of education applies to the ends and means of education and their interrelationships" (Wingo, 1974, p. 24). The assumption suggests the complexity of educational experience and the many variables/factors that influence the process. These assumptions clearly call for the descriptive, normative, and analytic perspectives of viewing educational realities, but also point toward the need for expanding our decision to accommodate other perspectives such as interpretive and critical forms of inquiry, as well as the empirical.
A way to expand my discussion to accommodate other perspectives that can be used in looking at the relationship between philosophy, inquiry, and education can be found in examining research paradigms. This framework (research paradigms) extends the more-traditional descriptive, normative, and analytic perspectives by looking at methodological/epistemological viewpoints. This framework allows the researcher to identify human interests within modes of inquiry.

Bredo and Feinberg (1982) discuss differing paradigms according to the research methodologies utilized. These methodologies have inherent interests in the kind of research findings sought and generated. The paradigms identified are the positivistic, the interpretive, and the critical approaches to social and educational research. These paradigms have fundamental differences that separate the positivistic from the interpretive and critical approaches. These differences are of a philosophical nature concerning metaphysics, subject-object dualism, generalization, causality, and axiology (Koetting, 1985).

If I pose the question "Why do we do research?", my response will allow me to explore the framework (research paradigms) as follows:

We do research in order to gain a clear/clearer perception of reality and our relationship to that reality. This clearer perception can be of benefit to us and others depending on our interests: What are we searching for? (Truth? Knowledge? Information? Understanding? Explanation? Emancipation?) This notion of interest also bears on why we ask certain research questions, as well as what the nature of the research question/problem/situation under investigation might be. Positivist science has an interest in technical control; interpretive science has an interest in understanding; and critical science has an interest in emancipation. For example, I may try to better control reality in order to make predictions, develop lawlike theories and explanations, establish causal relationships, etc. This would correspond to the positivist, empirical approach to research. I may want to better understand reality, and hence understand myself and others within a particular context. I may want to understand the meanings attached to social customs, the diversity of meaning in multiple interpretations of singular events, etc. This would correspond to the interpretive approach to research. I may want to better understand reality, and hence understand myself and others within a particular context in order to act within that context, to effect change. This corresponds to the critical approach to social and educational research.

There are fundamental differences that separate forms of inquiry, and the differences are of a philosophical nature. The differences are concerned with the three questions of philosophy stated earlier: metaphysics/ontology, epistemology, and axiology (also cf. Koetting, 1985, 1993). These concerns keep us rooted in doing philosophy.

Although I have used the term foundations frequently in this section, I am not talking about the establishment of a "metanarrative" (Lyotard, 1989; Hlynka & Yeaman, 1992). I am not talking about "doing philosophy in the grand manner" of building systems of thought (Wingo, 1974). I do not believe that there is only one complete explanation or understanding of our social world and that given the time and effort we will be able to "figure things out." What I am saying about foundations is the way in which philosophy is carried out—within philosophical inquiry, the problem posing, the questioning, the search for clarification, the quest for seeing things relationally—provides multiple ways of inquiring into the world of social and educational realities (see Chapters 9, 10).

Martusewicz and Reynolds (1994) state a similar position regarding foundations. They see the "job" of foundations . . . to raise questions and offer points of view that ask us to see what we do as teachers or as students in new or at least unfamiliar ways, from another side, perhaps from the inside, of perhaps from both inside and outside. It is an invitation to look at education both socially and historically as well as practically, that is, from the inside (the complex processes, methods, and relations that affect individuals in schools, for example) within the context of the outside (the larger social, economic, and political forces that have affected these processes over time) (p. 2).

This notion of inside/outside (school/world) suggests the "flux of boundaries," and allows the researcher/participant to see the relationships of seemingly separate realities, as well as questions the idea of foundations as a "stable set of knowledges, concepts, or principles to be discovered, defined, and then presented in a unilinear way" (Martusewicz & Reynolds, 1994, p. 3; also see Greene, 1974). Again, there is no one best way to explain what happens in the world or in education. Possibilities for understanding, however, can take place when we pay "particular attention to perspectives that maintain a critical stance, a willingness to put existing assumptions and interpretations into question" (Martusewicz & Reynolds, 1994, p. 3).

As I become engaged in this form of critical inquiry, I become involved in theory (foundations). There are multiple theoretical perspectives on the world, knowledge, value. However, there is no metanarrative. There is no grand philosophy (Greene, 1974, 1994; Martusewicz & Reynolds, 1994). Returning to an assumption made earlier in this chapter from Wingo (1974),

These assumptions are within a certain constellation of cultural conditions and therefore it cannot be studied as a set of universal and independent phenomena. Some set of relations among education, politics, and social institutions is inevitable and cannot be ignored in any useful analysis (p. 24).

There are multiple explanations/understandings of schooling, of the "world," and multiple ways of knowing. In the next section of this chapter, I will turn to a discussion of theory. Understanding the notion of theory can provide insight into the multiple interpretations of the world and experience. Theorizing is a mode of philosophical inquiry that suggests the complexities and possibilities for creating/constructing knowledge.
38.3 THEORY AND PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY

Theorizing is a mode of philosophical inquiry. It is an important mode of inquiry in that, as educators/researchers, we take a theoretical stance with regard to our work (Koetting, 1993). Stated another way, as educators/researchers, we work out of a theoretical framework that is very closely related to our orientation to the world. This happens whether we are conscious of it or not. Furthermore, it is important that we reflect on that stance, that we try to understand how that stance affects our practice, and, vice versa, that we understand how the practice influences our theoretical stance. This is directly related to my earlier discussion of the moral nature of our work (we intervene in the lives of people).

How do I define/talk about theory that helps shape my practice, and about how practice helps to shape theory? Stated simply, theory is a “worldview, a way of looking at and explaining a set of phenomena” (Martusewicz & Reynolds, 1994, p. 5). In relation to philosophy and education, Gutek (1988) refers to theory as a “grouping or clustering of general ideas or propositions that explain the operations of an institution, such as school, or a situation, such as teaching or learning,” and that these ideas are “sufficiently abstract or general that they can be transferred and applied to situations other than those in which they are directly developed” (p. 250). Theory can also refer to an “opinion that originates from trying to establish generalizable patterns from facts, information, or practices” (Gutek, 1988, p. 251).

Where do educational theories come from? How do educators arrive at theoretical positions? Gutek (1988) discusses three sources of educational theory. Educational theory can be derived from philosophies or ideologies; educational theory can be constructed from reactions to certain “social, political, and economic situations”; and theories can be constructed from educational practice. I will discuss each of these sources.

First, theories are derived from philosophies and ideologies. This is the study of philosophy of education. Education is examined within the broader context of individual philosophical systems. Although these systems may not have dealt specifically with education, educators, writers, and scholars derive educational positions from these philosophies and apply principles from their study to schooling. For example, progressivism, as a theory of education, is derived from elements of pragmatism and naturalism. Similarly, I can derive a theory of education from ideological positions. For example, a view of the American democratic ideology can be found in public school settings. Theories of education can be derived from a Marxist ideology. And finally, educational theories can be derived from blending philosophy and ideology, as in social reconstructionism, a blending of philosophical elements found in pragmatism, and ideological elements found in utopianism (cf. Gutek, 1988, pp. 250–55). This theorizing is philosophical inquiry.

A second way to develop educational theory is from reactions to certain “social, political, and economic situations.” Gutek (1988) suggests studying the history of American education to understand the reactive nature of educational theories. For example, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, educational critics said that:

Schools had become too formal, devitalized, and geared to rote learning. In some of the big cities, school systems were mired in political patronage and corruption. Progressivism as an educational movement and the various experimental schools that it simulated, including John Dewey’s at the University of Chicago, were reactions designed to bring about the reform of American society and education (p. 252).

This examination and critique of existing literature (cf. Anderson, 1990) is philosophical inquiry, is doing philosophy.

Finally, educational theories can be constructed from educational practice. The effective schools movement provides an example of theory derived from practice (Gutek, 1988). Schools, teachers, and administrators are singled out for their effectiveness in bringing about higher levels of student achievement. Research is conducted, findings are analyzed, generalizations and principles are offered. A research report is published by the Department of Education entitled What Works: Research about Teaching and Learning (1986, quoted in Gutek). The report . . . is based on a research investigation and analysis of school practices. Information about these practices is organized as findings. These findings have sufficient generality about them that they can be applied in various school settings. In other words, they represent an emerging theory of education (pp. 253–54).

Examples of theoretical generalizations and principles from the report are:

Parents are their children’s first and most influential teachers. What parents do to help their children learn is more important to academic success than how well-off the family is.

Children learn science best when they are able to do experiments, so they can witness “science in action.”

Belief in the value of hard work, the importance of personal responsibility, and the importance of education itself contribute to greater success in school (all quoted in Gutek, 1988, pp. 253–54).

These three sources allow us to engage in philosophical inquiry, theorizing possible understandings of realities/schooling. This theorizing is a mode of doing research, a way of doing philosophy. As stated at the beginning of this section, inquiry happens whether we are aware of it or not, and suggests the importance of “thinking about what we are doing” (Greene, 1974, quoting Arendt, p. 6). This theorizing, this doing philosophy, is what Greene (1974) refers to as “wide-awakeness,” thinking about commitment and action wherever we “work and make” our lives. “In other words, we shall attempt to do philosophy with respect to teaching, learning, the aims and policies of education, the choices to be made in classrooms, the goods to be pursued” (p. 6).
Another way of talking about theory, to identify the nature of differing theoretical positions, is to view theory in relation to method and interest (Koetting & Januszewski, 1991). From this viewpoint, knowledge of the world is constructed through a dialectical relationship with that world; i.e., we are shaped by our world, and we help to shape that world. Thus:

... theorizing about that world is part of a social process, and therefore, theory itself can be considered a social construction. Theorizing, as a social construction/social process, arises out of humankind's desire to explain and/or understand and/or to change the world (Koetting & Januszewski, 1991, p. 97).

This analysis is based on the work of Habermas (1971) and thus has a philosophical position within critical theory. Habermas's theory of knowledge and interests has three forms/processes of inquiry: empirical-analytic, historical-hermeneutic, and critical. Drawing upon a previous work (Koetting & Januszewski, 1991), I will briefly present these processes.

Theory can serve to explain both the conscious and unconscious. Theory can be seen as a "hypothetical position which can be proven/disproven through empirical testing." It suggests causal relationships:

This notion of explaining things is the basis for rational thought. Nomological knowledge is the result of such endeavours. Nomological suggests law-like propositions based on the results of the testing of hypotheses. This form of theory (empirical/analytic theory) has an interest in prediction and control (Koetting & Januszewski, 1991, p. 97).

Theory can serve to help us better understand/make sense of the world, as well ourselves and others within that world. When we are engaged in this form of investigation, our interest is not explanation but understanding. Thus we are involved in an

... interpretive mode of understanding/theorizing and this theoretical stance to the world sees reality as a social construction. This form of theory (historical/hermeneutic theory) has an interest in better understanding social construction through consensual agreement (Koetting & Januszewski, 1991, pp. 97-98).

The third use of theory can help us gain insight into seemingly "given" realities. Through a process of reflective critique we can:

... examine the social construction of reality and see ways to analyze the contradictions found in reality (the "is" and the "ought"). Through a shared vision we can begin to set about the enormous difficulty of changing (our) individual and group context (p. 98).

To effect change within that context a different understanding of reality is needed. This form of theorizing (critical theory) has an interest in emancipation. In this context emancipation means:

... the possibility of individuals freeing themselves from "law-like rules" and patterns of action in "nature" and history so that they can reflect and act on the dialectical process of creating and recreating themselves and their institutions' (Apple, 1975, p. 126). In this sense, emancipation is a continual process of "critique of everyday life" (Koetting & Januszewski, 1991, p. 98).

This discussion of theory/theorizing returns us to the main focus of this chapter: philosophy, inquiry, and education. There are fundamental differences within the empirical, hermeneutical, and theoretical modes of thinking and theorizing, and these differences are of a philosophical nature. Each form of inquiry has its own understanding of the nature of reality, the nature of knowledge, and the nature of value (metaphysics, epistemology, axiology) (see 9.3). Hence theory and theorizing raise questions of a philosophical nature. To become engaged in raising these questions is philosophical inquiry, is doing philosophy. This is the sense in which Eisner (1991) referred to philosophy as being nagging, "conjuring us" into asking more questions about the nature of things, generating "doubt and uncertainties," and, perhaps, hindering us in getting our work done.

Theory and theorizing does lead us to ask questions of a philosophic nature. Giarelli and Chamblis (1984) state that it is the philosopher's "task to ask the unasked questions" (p. 36). They state that "without a formulated question, there can be no inquiry" (p. 36). They identify the special task of philosophy as

... the formulation of questions for reflective thought. The philosopher, as a qualitative thinker, tries to cultivate a sensitivity to the situation as a whole and to the qualities that regulate it. For the philosopher, the issue always is, "What is the problem?" which in turn depends on a prior question, "What is this all about?" (p. 37).

The philosopher as "qualitative thinker" does not seek certain knowledge or truth, but rather is concerned with meaning. In this sense,

... philosophy does not aim at making the world, for its concern is not action, but qualities. Rather, philosophy serves an educational role. It mediates between immediate experience and experiment and promotes the intelligent development of value (Giarelli & Chamblis, 1984, p. 38).

The educational role of philosophy can be seen within public philosophy of education. Public philosophers of education "see the context of educational problems to be social and cultural life" (p. 40). The social and historical processes of education include the interactions of differing institutions and participants whose intent is to conserve, create, and criticize culture. Public philosophy focuses on creating a context for understanding the process of education as a whole.

Their methods are synthetic rather than analytic and aim to integrate and give synoptic meaning to knowledge from all perspectives (e.g., history, sociology, economics, anthropology, psychology, etc.), about all educative institutions (e.g., family, school, workplace, church, community, media, etc.), in order to construct a context or a vision of education in its widest cultural sense. Without such a con-
text, efforts to resolve educational problems will be short-
sighted and short-lived (p. 40).

This position of the public philosophers of education relates
to Wingo's (1974) second assumption that underlies the
nature of inquiry in the study of philosophy and education,
namely, that "Education always takes place within a certain
constellation of cultural conditions and therefore it cannot
be studied as a set of universal and independent phenome-
assumption and show the broader context of the discussion.8
They discuss the nature of questioning:

All questions arise from within a perceptual field, a whole,
across a context, or a situation. Inquiry is the exploration of ques-
tions (or queries) that arise and take particular shape in a
situation. The same may be said for "research," which word
comes from the Latin re-circere, "to go around again." Research
is going around, exploring, looking within a situa-
tion, context, or field. Inquiry, then, is not simply ques-
tioning or searching. It is questioning and searching with an
intent, with some limits, or with an object in mind (p. 36).

This questioning is a mode of philosophical inquiry and will
help to identify the fundamental problems in education,
which depend on an aesthetic judgment (axiology) of "where
the difficulty is and on qualitative thinking to bring these dif-
ficulties into the form of questions and problems that can be
researched" (Giarelli & Chambliss, 1984, p. 45). In other
words, these "questions and problems that can be researched"
are not arbitrary; they do not just "appear." They are contextu-
al, purposive, limited in scope, necessitating further question-
ing, and have a particular "object" in mind which changes as
we question, search, re-question, re-search.

My discussion in this section has gone from theory and
theorizing as philosophical inquiry to the nature of question-
ingen within the context of a public philosophy of education.
The nature of questioning, our engagement in the process of
questioning, is philosophical inquiry, is doing philosophy.

The present status of "doing philosophy," particularly
philosophy of education, has broadened into multiple dis-
courses. Ozmon and Craver (1995) suggest that the "current
mood" in philosophy of education is moving away from
"overriding systems of thought" and is concerned with prob-
lems and issues in particular contexts, becoming the new
arena for philosophy of education. At the same time, the
philosophical task remains one of "constant probing and
inquiry" (p. xxv). This suggests to me the notion of public
philosophy of education mentioned above in the work of
Giarelli and Chambliss (1984). This "new arena of philos-
ophy" is what was meant by the construction of a "context or
vision of education in its widest cultural sense" (p. 40).

38.4 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION:
DOING PHILOSOPHY

I want to revisit some concepts/terms used during the
course of this chapter. This will be done matter-of-factly,
cryptically, to the point.

- Education is a moral undertaking, and therefore our
  practice within education must be open to reflective
  inquiry.
- To engage in philosophical inquiry is to theorize, to
  analyze, to critique, to raise questions about, and/or to
  pose as problematic.
- Theory can be derived from other systems of thought—
  from social, political, and/or economic situations—and
  can be constructed from practice.
- Philosophical inquiry is concerned with (i.e., "inquires
  into") the nature of reality, knowledge, and value.
- Philosophical inquiry is descriptive, normative, and
  analytic. It is interpretive and critical.
- Modes of philosophical inquiry have interests: inter-
  pretive inquiry has an interest in understanding; criti-
  cal inquiry has an interest in emancipation.
- Critical inquiry is a mode of philosophical inquiry that
  questions the nature of things, questions reality, looks
  for contradictions, and is change oriented.
- The major task of philosophy is the posing of ques-
  tions. It is the basis for research; it is the foundation.
  Without good questions, there is no inquiry.
- Philosophical inquiry is doing philosophy.
- Philosophical inquiry is philosophical research.

Quantitative research also relies on philosophical
even a study (e.g., a dissertation) that has a "quantitative
formulation" has a

. . . . qualitative context out of which it grows and to which
its conclusions must be put. The "statement of the problem"
in such a study, to be made clearly, calls on philosophy, and
the chapter in which conclusions are suggested to be impor-
tant (for further research or for practice) is philosophical in
its axiological import. And one may see a "review of the lit-
erature" in any study as an historical account of what has
been tried in reference to the problem at hand (p. 33).

This position captures the sense in which I believe philos-
ophy and its modes of inquiry are the foundation for educa-
tional research.

As I have stressed during this chapter, philosophical
inquiry is doing philosophy. Maxine Greene (1974) has
captured, in a very insightful and existential way, what it
means to do philosophy. I have used her work in the course
of this chapter, and I would like to present a few more of
her thoughts on what it means to do philosophy.

Greene (1974) regards philosophy as a way to approach
(a way to look at, or to take a stance with respect to) knowl-
edge gained through study of the sciences and the arts, as
well as the personal understandings and insights that each
of us acquires through daily life. Philosophy allows us a
way to ask questions that have to do with:

. . . . what is presupposed, perceived, intuited, believed, and
known. It is a way of contemplating, examining, or think-
ing about what is taken to be significant, valuable, beauti-
ful, worthy of commitment. It is a way of becoming
self-aware, of constituting meanings in one's life-world.
Critical thinking is demanded, as are deliberate attempts to make things clear (p. 7).

There is the exploration of "background consciousness" and boundaries; there is the creation of "unifying perspectives"; there is normative thinking; there is the "probing of what might be, what should be," and the "forging of ideals." Doing philosophy is becoming conscious of the world as it presents itself to our consciousness. "To do philosophy, as Jean-Paul Sartre says, is to develop a fundamental project, to go beyond the situations one confronts and refuse reality as given in the name of a reality to be produced" (p. 7).

To do educational philosophy, we must become critically aware of the complexities of the teaching and learning context. We must clarify the meanings of education and the language of schooling. We must become clear about preferences for the "good" and the "right" which motivate pressure groups as they place demands on schools (Greene, 1974, p. 7). This calls for critical, analytic, and normative philosophical inquiry.

We do philosophy (theorize) when, for whatever reason, we are:

... aroused to wonder about how events and experiences are interpreted and should be interpreted. We philosophize when we can no longer tolerate the splits and fragmentations in our pictures of the world, when we desire some kind of wholeness and integration, some coherence which is our own (Greene, 1974, pp. 10-11).

This requires that we be "wide-awake" within our world, with others, within our communities. To be closed off because of

... snobbery, ignorance, or fear is to be deprived of the content that makes concepts meaningful. It is, as well, to be deprived of the very ground of questioning. For this reason, the teacher who dares to do philosophy must be open to such a multiplicity of realities. He cannot do so if he cannot perceive himself, in both his freedom and his limitations, as someone who must constitute his own meanings with the aid of what his culture provides. Nor can he do so if he is incapable of "bracketing," or setting aside, on occasion the presuppositions that fix his vision of the world (Greene, 1974, p. 11).

I sense that this feeling of a fractured, fragmented world is part of the human condition, our sense of not "being at home" in the world. To remain open to multiple perspectives of the world, to create our own meanings and yet have to bracket them to understand another, etc., leaves one with a sense of unequeness (cf., Koettering, 1994). And yet not to be able to do this, leaves us (teachers), like our students, to live in a world that is primarily prefabricated by others for what they consider to be "the public." Thus:

On occasion, he must be critically attentive; he must consciously choose what to appropriate and what to discard. Reliance on the natural attitude—a commonsense taking for granted of the everyday—will not suffice. In some fashion, the everyday must be rendered problematic so that questions may be posed (Greene, 1974, p. 11).

Greene is speaking of the difficult task of maintaining a philosophical attitude, a person/teacher who sees philosophically, and can communicate that attitude to students, that sense of empowerment to transform their situations. Thus students:

... need to be enabled—through habituation and stimulation—to initiate inquiries. To be equipped for inquiry is to be equipped to engage in a process through which objects and events can be seen in connection with other objects and events in the experienced world (Greene, 1974, p. 158).

This is working with students to do philosophy, to develop the philosophical attitude/orientation; this is seeing realities relationally and not in isolation. We need to show, as well as believe, that students are capable of doing philosophy.

Maxine Greene identifies what it means to do philosophy, to engage in philosophical inquiry. I have presented many of the theoretical positions that she demonstrates. I have referred to this as the philosophical attitude/orientation. There are many texts that will convey this attitude which would be helpful for initiating or continuing study in educational research.

There are texts on inquiry that are of a philosophical nature, that present in great depth the theoretical positions, the modes of inquiry, and examples of critical research. There are texts within the field of educational technology that convey the theoretical positions for engaging in multiple forms of research. And there are texts of critical essays that are examples of the forms of philosophical inquiry discussed in this chapter. They are examples of doing philosophy.


ENDNOTES

1. Recent educational critics suggest that we have lost this sense of education as a moral undertaking. Representative essays of a philosophical nature would be Beyer, 1988; Purpel, 1993; Giroux, 1988; Aronowitz & Giroux, 1985.

2. Examples of descriptive philosophical inquiry can be found in the following philosophy of education texts: Wingo, 1974; Gutek, 1988; Ozmon & Craver, 1995.


4. Examples of analytic inquiry would be Tom, 1984; Wilson, 1963.

5. The foundational (theoretical) text that influenced my study was Jurgen Habermas, 1971. Also, as secondary texts, Bernstein (1976) offers an historical perspective and overview of mainstream social science and moves through theoretical positions of language, analysis, phenomenology, and critical theory (also Schroyer, 1973).

6. Note the chapters in this volume on "Postmodern and Poststructuralist Theory" (Yeaman et al., Chapter 10)
and on "Critical Theory and Educational Technology" (Nichols & Allen-Brown, Chapter 9).

7. This discussion of theorizing relates to my earlier discussion of research paradigms and interest.


REFERENCES


