38.2 Philosophy and Inquiry

Although I was critical of Anderson's (1990) discussion of philosophy and research, I do think he accurately represented the processes of philosophical inquiry: conceptual analysis, situating educational issues within a philosophical tradition, and the examination of epistemological and axiological assumptions, criticism, etc. He also emphasized critical thinking and analysis of existing literature and theory as part of philosophical inquiry. These processes are modes of philosophical inquiry, ways of doing philosophy.

My criticism of Anderson's position centered on his viewing philosophy as an "associated discipline" for research, whereas I believe it to be a foundation (theory) for educational research. To begin to address philosophy as foundation, I will return to the three questions that have concerned philosophers within the Western traditions from the beginning.

What is the nature of reality? What is the nature of knowledge? What is of value (metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, respectively)? These questions provide a conceptualframework that gives coherence to the study of philosophy. These questions also identify the major concerns of education and provide the possibility for a coherence in educational practice. By coherence I mean they provide educators with a possible framework for posing questions from multiple perspectives that allow us to reflect on our work. For example, they allow us to pose multiple questions regarding the nature of curricula. They allow us to examine whose knowledge we are promoting, and, even prior to that, what knowledge is of most worth. Questions of value ask us why we choose this particular knowledge and leave all of the rest out, etc. Engaging in this questioning is philosophical inquiry, is "doing" philosophy.

Another framework I can use in looking at the relationship among philosophy, research, and education would be an examination of the differing approaches to the study of philosophy. Wingo (1974) states that we can approach the study of philosophy in three different ways (these ways may also be looked at as the main functions of philosophy): the descriptive, the normative, and the analytic (pp. 15‑16). To engage in descriptive philosophical inquiry, a student would be involved in the study of the history of philosophy. She or he would be studying

... what is (and has been) the field of philosophy. Working comprehensively, he is trying to picture the general development of philosophical thought (p. 15).

This is more than studying "intellectual history." As vvringo points out, it is possible to study about what philosophers have said, and at the same time be doing philosophy in that students are "analyzing and clarifying concepts and the language in which ideas are expressed" (p. 15). This is the area that Anderson (1990) identified as situating educational issues within a philosophical tradition‑for example, educational issues looked at from the viewpoint of different philosophies, and what writers within those philosophical traditions said. about the issues, how they would go about making sense of those issues, establish a world view (metaphysics/ontology), a way of knowing (epistemology), and a way to make decisions regarding action (axiology). Philosophy of education textbooks would be good examples of the descriptive perspective (see endnote 2).

To engage in normative philosophical inquiry a student would be involved with values (axiology). Interests could focus on

... ethics or aesthetics. He will be involved with advocating some ends or objectives (values) that he believes to be desirable and with explaining the reasons for their desirability. He may also be involved in suggesting means for advocating these values. His main concern is not what is, but what ought to be (p. 15).

Normative philosophical inquiry explores and critiques philosophical positions, as well as makes decisions as the "rightness and wrongness" of those positions (see Webb et al., 1992). The normative perspective reflects Anderson's (1990) earlier position regarding examination of epistemological and axiological assumptions, as well as critical thinking and analysis of existing literature and theory as part of inquiry (see endnote 3).

To engage in analytic philosophical inquiry is to engage in the "analysis of language, concepts, theories, and so on" (Wingo, 1974, p. 15). This is the practice that analytic philosophers consider "doing philosophy." According to Webb et al. (1992), analytic philosophy has as its goal

... to improve our understanding of education by clarifying our educational concepts, beliefs, arguments, assumptions. For example, an analytic philosophy of education would attempt to understand such questions as: What is experience? What is understanding? What is readiness? (pp. 174‑75).

Anderson referred to the analytic perspective as conceptual analysis (see endnote 4).

The framework of the "functions" of philosophy suggests the foundations position mentioned earlier. Each of these three functions can provide multiple possibilities for educational research and, more specifically, philosophical inquiry. The descriptive, normative, and analytic forms of philosophical inquiry suggest in‑depth study of the philosophy of education. Looking at different philosophical traditions with regard to metaphysics/ontology, epistemology, and axiology requires study in philosophy. Movements in education, e.g., reconstructionism, perrenialism, Marxism and education, and more recent movements rooted in critical theory, postmodern analyses, and renewed emphasis on democratic schooling and forms of emancipatory praxis represent major areas of study for researchers (see Chapters 9, 10). These areas of study have their own world views and concerns. Writers within these positions offer differing conceptual frameworks, differing questions posed, and hence challenges to status quo practice. And they all engage the student in philosophical inquiry.

I believe that the study of the philosophy of education from the normative, descriptive, and analytic perspectives offers critical means of inquiry into educational realities for researchers. Writing within these frameworks‑ is doing philosophy. Doing philosophy is doing research. 'Me descriptive perspective works out of systems of philosophical thought, schools of thought, and offering foundational positions from which to work; the normative perspective offers a "process of inquiry into ideas and basic beliefs that will enable us to form reasoned attitudes about the important issues of our time" (Wingo, 1974, p. 22). The analytic perspective allows us to inquire into the use of language, the meaning and clarification of language used to talk about education. This is philosophical inquiry. This is doing philosophy.

Education, being a very complex social undertaking, has many important dimensions that can be examined from psychological (see Chapters 2, 5), sociological, and political perspectives, yet there is one question that is uniquely philosophical (see Chapter 6): "the question of determining the ends of education" (Wingo, 1974, p. 22). The means and ends of education are inseparably united. Wingo (1974) quotes Max Black:

All serious discussion of educational problems, no matter how specific, soon leads to consideration of educational aims, and becomes a conversation about the good life, the nature of man, the varieties of experience. But these are the perennial themes of philosophical investigation. It might be a hard thing to expect educators to be philosophical, but can they be anything else? (p. 22).

Conceptualizations about "the good life," the nature of humankind, etc., are problematic in the sense that there are no final, all‑inclusive positions on these concepts. Inquiry into these issues can take place through the descriptive, normative, and analytic perspectives. Each of these perspectives, again, will demand that different questions be posed. This process is doing philosophy, doing philosophical inquiry.

To understand how the three perspectives can be used in the study of education, Wingo (1974) suggests that there are three assumptions that underlie the nature of philosophical inquiry in education. These three assumptions are critical to an understanding of the importance, scope, and possibility the study of philosophy has for the study of education. As obvious as it may seem, the first assumption is: "The primary subject matter of philosophy of education is education itself' (p. 24). Thus the phenomena of education, in all its myriad forms, are the "subject matter" for study. From a research point of view this can mean looking at curricula, the outcomes of learning, testing, organizational matters, place of schools within the social setting, the means‑ends of education, etc., etc.

The second, and perhaps the most insightful and critical assumption, states that "Education always takes place within a certain constellation of cultural conditions and therefore it cannot be studied as a set of universal and independent phenomena" (p. 24). This assumption means that there is no "one best system" to model schools after and no single answer to complex educational situations. This assumption suggests that we need to view education relationally, in context (cf. Apple, 1979; Beyer, 1986; Purpel, 1993), and clearly identifies the complex nature of understanding education. At the same time, this assumption suggests the myriad possibilities for inquiry into the process of schooling. By this I mean that the nature of the inquiry is dependent on the researcher. It is not standardized; it is not given (cf. Eisner, 1991).

The third assumption states that the "basic purpose of philosophy of education applies to the ends and means of education and their interrelationships" (Wingo, 1974, p. 24). The assumption suggests the complexity of educational experience and the many variables/factors that influence the process. These assumptions clearly call for the descriptive, normative, and analytic perspectives of viewing educational realities, but also point toward the need for expanding our decision to accommodate other perspectives such as interpretive and critical forms of inquiry, as well as the empirical.

A way to expand my discussion to accommodate other perspectives that can be used in looking at the relationship between philosophy, inquiry, and education can be found in examining research paradigms. This framework (research paradigms) extends the more‑traditional descriptive, normative, and analytic perspectives by looking at methodological/epistemological viewpoints. This framework allows the researcher to identify human interests within modes of inquiry (see endnote 5).

Bredo and Feinberg (1982) discuss differing paradigms according to the research methodologies utilized. These methodologies have inherent interests in the kind of research findings sought and generated. The paradigms identified are the positivistic, the interpretive, and the critical approaches to social and educational research. These paradigms have fundamental differences that separate the positivistic from the interpretive and critical approaches. These differences are of a philosophical nature concerning metaphysics, subject‑object dualism, generalization, causality, and axiology (Koetting, 1985).

If I pose the question "Why do we do research?", my response will allow me to explore the framework (research paradigms) as follows:

We do research in order to gain a clear/clearer perception of reality and our relationship to that reality. This clearer perception can be of benefit to us and others depending on our interests: What are we searching for? (Truth? Knowledge? Information? Understanding? Explanation? Emancipation?) This notion of interest also bears on why we ask certain research questions, as well as what the nature of the research question/problem/situation under investigation trdght be. Positivist science has an interest in technical control; interpretive science has an interest in understanding; and critical science has an interest in emancipation. For example, I may try to better control reality in order to make predictions, develop lawlike theories and explanations, establish causal relationships, etc. This would correspond to the positivist, empirical approach to research. Itnay want to better understand reality, and hence understand myself and others within a particular context. I may want to understand the meanings attached to social customs, the diversity of meaning in multiple interpretations of singular events, etc. This would correspond to the interpretive approach to research. I may want to better understand reality, and hence understand myself and others within a particular context in order to act within that context, to effect change. This corresponds to the critical approach to social and educational research.

There are fundamental differences that separate forms of inquiry, and the differences are of a philosophical nature. The differences are concerned with the three questions of philosophy stated earlier: metaphysics/ontology, epistemology, and axiology (also cf. Koetting, 1985, 1993). These concerns keep us rooted in doing philosophy.

Although I have used the tennfoundations frequently in this section, I am not talking about the establishment of a "metanarrative" (Lyotard, 1989, Hlynka & Yeaman, 1992).   I am not talking about "doing philosophy in the grand manner" of building systems of thought (Wingo, 1974). 1 do not believe that there is only one complete explanation or understanding of our social world and that given the time and effort we will be able to "figure things out." What I am saying about foundations is the way in which philosophy is carried out‑within philosophical inquiry, the problem posing, the questioning, the search for clarification, the quest for seeing things relationally‑provides multiple ways of inquiring into the world of social and educational realities (see Chapters 9, 10).

Martusewicz and Reynolds (1994) state a similar position regarding foundations. They see the "job" of foundations

... to raise questions and offer points of view that ask us to see what we do as teachers or as students in new or at least unfamiliar ways, from another side, perhaps from the inside, of perhaps from both inside and outside. It is an invitation to look at education both socially and historically as well as practically, that is, from the inside (the complex processes, methods, and relations that affect individuals in schools, for example) within the context of the outside (the larger social, economic, and political forces that have affected those processes over time) (p. 2).

This notion of inside/outside (school/world) suggests the "flux of boundaries," and allows the researcher/participant to see the relationships of seemingly separate realities, as well as questions the idea of foundations as a "stable set of knowledges, concepts, or principles to be di scovered, defined, and then presented in a unilinear way" (Martusewicz & Reynolds, 1994, p. 3; also see Greene, 1974). Again, there is no one best way to explain what happens in the world or in education. Possibilities for understanding, however, can take place when we pay "particular attention to perspectives that maintain a critical stance, a willingness to put existing assumptions and interpretations into question" (Mantusewicz & Reynolds, 1994, p. 3).

As I become engaged in this form of critical inquiry, I become involved in theory (foundations). There are multiple theoretical perspectives on the world, knowledge, value (see endnote 6). However, there is no metanarrative. There is no grand philosophy (Greene, 1974, 1994; Martusewicz & Reynolds, 1994). Returning to an assumption made earlier in this chapter from Ytringo (1974),

Education always takes place within a certain constellation of cultural conditions and therefore it cannot be studied as a set of universal and independent phenomena. Some set of relations among education, politics, and social institutions is inevitable and cannot be ignored in any useful analysis (p. 24).

There are multiple explanations/understandings of schooling, of the "world," and multiple ways of knowing. In the next section of this chapter, I will turn to a discussion of theory. Understanding the notion of theory can provide insight into the multiple interpretations of the world and experience. Theorizing is a mode of philosophical inquiry that suggests the complexities and possibilities for creating/ constructing knowledge.